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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

12 October 1955

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 75-55

SUBJECT: Scheduling Recommendations on NEA Estimates

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1. We recommend that:

- a. SNIE 34-2-55: Arms Aid and Iranian Adherence to the Baghdad Pact be cancelled.

This estimate, which was held over by the IAC on 11 October, was requested at a time when Iranian willingness to join the Baghdad Pact was uncertain and contemplated possible promises of additional military aid to Iran as an inducement to its joining. Since then Iran has formally announced its decision to adhere and has made it clear that, in the light of the US views communicated by Ambassador Chapin on 7 October, it considered the US committed to providing additional military aid. A US statement welcoming Iranian adherence to the Pact and presumably indicating US intentions on the aid issue will probably have to be made before the next IAC meeting.

b.

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(1)



- (2) The policy people, using SNIE 30-3-55, are already engaged in what should be an urgent effort to cope with the dangers involved in the situation. Although a situation may arise in which one or more additional special estimates might be useful on a crash basis, the stage has long since been passed where a general treatment of the subject, such as that provided by NIE 30-2-55, would do the policy makers any good. Such a treatment, however, might be useful sometime next year. State has been studying intensively the question of significantly improving the situation, and the point where we might provide any useful guidance was clearly passed when the Secretary made his statement on 26 August.

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- (3) Finally, we do not believe that NIE 30-2-55, can be quietly pushed through on a sort of "extension of remarks" basis. Although some material could be bodily lifted from SNIE 30-3-55, the temper of the IAC representatives in the SNIE 30-3-55 sessions indicates that there would still be a good deal of pulling and hauling and nitpicking.

- c. The new estimate on Greece be advanced from the Third to the First Quarter of 1956.

The death of Prime Minister Papagos almost certainly necessitates preparation of a new estimate sooner than previously planned, since NIE 32-55 (The Outlook for Greece, 18 January 1955) was of necessity largely based on Papagos' remaining politically active. However, we did take serious cognizance of the possibility of his death or retirement and think we are adequately covered for the next few months prior to new elections by Conclusion 3 and supporting Discussion material. We believe that we

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should put out a new Greek estimate as soon as possible after the new elections (probably to take place in early 1956) but that it would be otiose to attempt to chart in detail the political milling around which will almost certainly go on until then or to stick our necks out as to exactly how the Greek people will act at the polls.

2. Proposed Action

- a. The DCI be asked to check with the Secretary of State, the original requester, indicating our view that SNIE 34-2-55 appears to be no longer useful, at least in its present form. Assuming that the Secretary agrees, the IAC should be asked to cancel the paper formally.
- b. The IAC be asked to cancel NIE 30-2-55 for the reasons given in Paragraph 1 b (1) and (2) above.
- c. The IAC agencies be notified that we plan to propose advancing the Greek estimate to the First Quarter 1956 in the next revision of the Estimates Program. (The principal reasons for notifying the agencies at this time are: (1) this will give them some warning of a demand on their productive time; and (2) there may be some uncertainty about our intentions in the light of Papagos' death. Benjamin of AF has already raised the question informally.)

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